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THE NATURAL LAW
AND SOCIAL JUSTICE
JOHN C. FITZGERALDt
T HE TERM "SOCIAL JUSTICE" has been in such general use for the past
few decades (both outside and inside the scope of campaign oratory,
because I suspect that to many the political synonym of social justice
is "fair deal," or "new deal," or "square deal") that, when I first set
about the task of organizing some thoughts for this occasion, I turned
light-heartedly to LeBuffe and Hayes for a neat formulation of its defini-
tion. Out of the world-wide depression and the social encyclicals there
must have emerged, I thought, some satisfactory workable definition
that could serve at least as a starting point for such a discussion as this.
But what did I find in LeBuffe and Hayes? The statement that traditional
scholastic jurisprudence recognized only three kinds of justice: commu-
tative, legal, and distributive, the kinds, alas so conveniently assigned
to my colleagues of the day and not to myself. And what of "social
justice"? LeBuffe and Hayes themselves asked whether there was "war-
rant to take this term as indicating a fourth new division of justice,"
and then answered their own question as follows:
Some writers affirm, others deny. Since ... the whole question is disputed,
it seems wisest merely to indicate it. Certainly this much may be said that
all the problems which are currently assigned to social justice can be
allocated within the framework of the traditional threefold division. 1
tDean and Professor of Law, Loyola University of Chicago School of Law.
I LE BUFFE, S.J. AND HAYES, THE AMERICAN PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 379 (1953).
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At this point of preparation, it occurred
to me that today's discussion might well
involve some overlapping, some duplication
of effort; and it further occurred to me that
there was some disadvantage in not attend-
ing the preliminary meetings of those who
arranged this schedule and of those who
assigned the topics for today. There must
be some principle of natural law, akin to
procedural due process, that protects the
absent member who finds himself, at first
glance at any rate, assigned a topic which
seems to have no existence of its own.
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But the mere statement that "social jus-
tice is non-existent," particularly in the
light of the developments of the last few
decades, forces the realization that our
problem is really one of classification and
not of substance.
According to traditional sources, justice
includes three elements which in lawyer's
language today would be described as an
obligor, an obligee, and the subject matter
of the obligation. In more traditional terms,
it is the obligation of a person owed to
someone other than himself because of the
other's title. Whatever differences may exist
in the traditional three types of justice re-
flect merely a change in the persons of
obligor and obligee: the obligation from
person to person (commutative); from per-
son to society (legal); and from society to
person (distributive). The basis of com-
mutative justice is the individual's right to
what already is his, to something exclu-
sively ordered to his use. The basis of dis-
tributive justice is the individual's right to
something which is common property but
which society owes him as a member of
society; the basis of legal justice is society's
right to something which a member of
society owes to society.
What is the basis of social justice?
The basis of social justice seems to me
to be at a level even more fundamental
than, or at least as fundamental as, that
of the law of private contracts (commuta-
tive justice), or the Selective Service Act
(legal justice), or the graduated income tax
feature of the Internal Revenue Code (dis-
tributive justice). Social justice seems to
rest upon three bases: first, upon man's re-
lationship to this planet; secondly, upon
man's relationship to man; and thirdly, upon
a particular value judgment.
As to man's relationship to this planet:
man is under a duty to grow and develop,
to seek his end. But, his only source of
sustenance is earth-bound; the earth and its
products. Therefore, he has a claim to sus-
tenance from the earth. The primary pur-
pose of the earth and its products is to
serve man. It does not lose this primary
purpose by becoming the private property
of an individual. X owns, but X is under
an obligation to see that what X owns
achieves its purpose. This is the social
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aspect of property, the stewardship concept
of property. This is Andrew Carnegie's con-
cept for he challenged the wealthy to be "a
trustee for the poor, entrusted for a season
with a great part of the increased wealth
of the community, but administering it for
the community." Perhaps this is the rule
of St. Benedict of the fifth century who,
among his voluntary and religious associ-
ates, demanded from each according to his
ability and gave to each according to his
need; a principle which seems to me to
be nothing more than a very attractively
worded statement of the underlying rule of
social justice, a principle so attractively
worded indeed that others have adopted it
for purposes entirely foreign to the mind of
St. Benedict.
As to the second basis of social justice,
man's relationship to man: man as a social
animal both physically and mentally awakes,
strives, and attains his full growth only by
competition, by interaction. Man knows he
cannot attain his full potential alone; other
human contacts are necessary in order to
evaluate ideas, challenge assumptions, stim-
ulate the energies, exchange reassurances,
appraise the trial, and pin-point the error;
in short, to provide the push and pull, the
give and take, that toughen into maturity
the mind of man. This is the structure of
man. May we recall Aristotle's observation
that:
He who is unable to live in society, or who
has no need because he is sufficient for him-
self, must be either a beast or a God?
And the third basis of social justice, I
suggest, is a value judgment, to wit, the ulti-
mate value-identity of each and every man.
Thus, the obligations of social justice
seem to flow from man's relationship to
property, from man's relationship to man,
and from the ultimate value of each man.
If our problem of classification involved
merely two individual members of one
political community, the one wallowing in
the luxury of his personal Fort Knox, sur-
rounded by huge deep-freezers containing
tons of frozen food, and the other retching
from hunger outside the wall, then the
obligor, the obligee, and the obligation
would be obvious. Moreover, if the obliga-
tion (whether termed charity or social jus-
tice) were not voluntarily performed, the
political community through legal and dis-
tributive justice would swiftly provide the
answer. But how does one classify when
not individuals but groups are involved?
When the obligee is not a specified individ-
ual but Li'l Abner's Lower Slobbovia or the
inhabitants thereof-when no international
government exists so that the putative
obligor does not come within the territorial
jurisdiction of the society to which the
legal justice obligation runs or from which
the distributive justice duty flows? Further-
more, we must think not in the simple
terms of the frozen meat and a hunger-
bloated stomach, but rather in terms of a
system of production, pricing, and distribu-
tion which is so inter-related and compli-
cated that we are apparently incapable of,
devising ways and means of bringing to-
gether, for example, our agricultural sur-
pluses and the millions of underfed fellow
human beings ranged around the globe.
Whether we look merely at this nation,
however, or at the entire planet, the funda-
mental fact is that the means of satisfying
the needs of man (in that broadest sense
of a system of production, pricing, and dis-
tribution) are scarce in relation to the
needs. And when the means are scarce in
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relation to the needs, we have a practical
demand of social justice.
The problems of social justice today
emerge in terms of groups rather than of
individuals and in terms of competing sys-
tems of economics rather than of a face-
to-face exchange of goods for immediate
consumption. And although social justice
is not limited by the territorial boundaries
of a nation, there does not exist that fed-
eration of nations, seeking the common
good of all peoples, which the basic unity
and identity of the human race would
seem to demand.
It is not surprising, therefore, to find
general agreement on the nature and ex-
istence of* the practical demands consti-
tuting social justice side by side with
general disagreement on how to fit social
justice into the traditional tri-partite divi-
sion of justice which was constructed with
an eye to simpler, more direct, more
obvious relationships.
How do some of the contemporary
writers attempt to solve this problem of
classification of social justice? There is
heavy semantic gunfire here. For a sampling
let's turn to Dr. Rommen.
Dr. Rommen apparently identifies social
justice with distributive justice. He says:
Social and distributive justice refer to the
public authorities who have to take care of
the order of the common good, the welfare
of the community. Their obligation accord-
ing to social justice is to bring about such
a social order and such economic conditions
that the individual member in the com-
munity is enabled to fulfill the demands of
commutative justice, e.g., pay a family
wage.... Restrictive legislation for child
labor and female labor would thus be a de-
mand of social justice or, as it is sometimes
called, common-good justice. 2
He continues:
We may go a step further by giving social
justice a larger content than the traditional
legal or common-good justice. For social
justice addresses the individuals as members
of the order of the common good. 3
Father Cantwell, on the other hand, sug-
gests that social justice is a fourth species:
that it is not commutative justice because
it does not concern specified individuals
since one cannot designate an individual
obligor or an individual obligee; that it is
neither legal nor distributive justice because
it may exist independently of civil society,4
the problem, as I understand it, of Li'l
Abner's Lower Slobbovia.
Vangheluwe defines social justice as be-
ing the same as legal justice; that virtue
which inclines members of a society to
render to the society that which is due to
it whether from the positive law of the
society or from obvious and common neces-
sity because of the common good.5 Thus,
Vangheluwe believes that the three tradi-
tional forms cover every conceivable cate-
gory of relationship in justice.
Messner suggests that social justice be
distinguished from legal justice in that the
obligations of legal justice have their basis
chiefly in positive law whereas the obliga-
tions of social justice are derived prin-
cipally from natural justice. 6 And although
Messner frequently seems to identify social
2 ROMMEN, THE STATE IN CATHOLIC THOUGHT
321 (1947).
3 Ibid.
4 Cantwell, A Fourth Species of Justice, II SOCIAL
ORDER 69 (1949).
5 Schuyler, S.J., Vangheluwe on Social Justice, I
SOCIAL ORDER 203 (1949).
6 MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS 219-220 (1949).
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justice with distributive justice particularly
within the framework of an economic sys-
tem of private production, pricing, and
distribution of economic goods, yet he
points out that references to social justice
usually are to obligations on the part of
groups whereas distributive justice concerns
the obligation of the state to maintain an
adequate social policy.
Josef Pieper in Justice, the latest book in
his series on virtues which is described as
a "summing up of human and political wis-
dom" (as far as I could determine on a
once-read basis, it contains no index) does
not use the term or refer to social justice.
In discussing the common good, however,
he does suggest that ".... all the good things
bestowed in creation (men's capacities and
abilities) belong to the 'good of the com-
munity,' and that iustitia distributiva entails
the obligation of granting such abilities the
protection, support, and fostering they
need." 7 This would seem to bring what is
termed social justice within Pieper's notion
of distributive justice and to bring Pieper's
notion very close to Messner's.
These differences in the thinking of con-
temporary writers on the proper classifica-
tion of social justice pay tribute to the vigor,
the dynamic nature, the fruitfulness of the
basic concept. These differences emphasize,
furthermore, that the purpose of seeking
such a classification is merely to aid in the
understanding and use of the basic concept.
Social justice is a uniquely significant
mandate to the reason: the demand that
mankind achieve with the means available
the optimum fulfillment of man's life. There
cannot be any closed-circuit thinking on a
basic concept which challenges man to
7 PIEPER, JUSTICE 89 (1955).
bring the fruits of the earth to all mankind.
And so we find confirmed by others the
LeBuffe and Hayes view that problems cur-
rently assigned to social justice can be
allocated within the framework of the tradi-
tional three-fold division. Note well, that
every suggested definition of social justice
contained some reference to the common
good. There is wide agreement, therefore,
that social justice is somehow wedded to
the common good. This leads to the thought
that some of the difficulties of classification
may depart if we consider the obligation of
social justice, although resting upon in-
dividuals, to consist of a duty to act in the
formation and reformation of those social
institutions concerned with the common
good. It may be considered, in other words,
as an individual's duty to participate in the
creation of a climate or an environment con-
ducive to the common good.
Before examining the common good,
however, let us look for a moment at the
American scene. The meaning of a term
may well emerge from history; and, in the
achievements in the United States through
the last few decades, we may find a kind
of empirical definition of social justice. As
a partial list we may consider safety regu-
lations; laws regulating minimum wages
and maximum hours; the regulation of work
on Sundays and holidays; special regulation
of work by women and children; accident,
sickness, disability, and old-age insurance;
retirement pensions; insurance of bank ac-
counts; the Securities and Exchange Act;
anti-monopoly legislation; tax laws accord-
ing to the ability to pay; Workmen's Com-
pensation laws; provisions for employment
through public works; public housing; laws
protecting the right of labor to organize;
Unemployment Compensation acts; the lev-
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eling out of prices through various forms
of credit control; health and welfare funds.
This is an impressive litany of social justice.
Messner indeed has suggested that the
operating criterion of social justice is the
level of the standard of living: the wider
and higher the degree of the distribution of
the economic products, the higher the level
of social justice (to Messner distributive
justice).
In this respect, note the following statis-
tics (in each case the comparison is 1929
with 1953 unless otherwise specified); and
please visualize these statistics in the form
of housing, clothing, food, education, lei-
sure, repaired teeth, and straightened limbs:
-the following figures do not take into con-
sideration the decrease in the purchasing
power of the dollar.
National income has increased from 87.8
billion to 303.6 billion; 8
Wages and salaries have increased from
50.4 billion to 198 billion; 9
In the area of supplemental payments
(fringe benefits) the employer contribution
to private pension and welfare funds in-
creased from 169 million to 5 billion 72
million (in 1954);10 in 1950, only 10 per
cent of the union contracts provided for
pensions and only 30 per cent for social
insurance-now 45 per cent provide for
pensions and 70 per cent for insurance; 11
Employer contributions for social insurance
increased from 101 million to 5 billion 91
million (in 1954);12
8 U. S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUSINESS STATISTICS
2 (1955).
9 Id. at 4.
10 THE ECONOMIC ALMANAC 450 (Jones and
Kaplan eds. 1956).
11 U. S. DEP'T OF LABOR, MONTHLY LABOR RE-
VIEW (September, 1955).
12 THE ECONOMIC ALMANAC 450.
Compensation for workmen's injuries in-
creased from 278 million to 969 million (in
1954).13
Difficult as it may be to define social jus-
tice, it is not difficult to see it realized in
this index, in this partial list. Social justice
is embodied in these developments in the
United States. Isn't it very difficult today
to recall the fact of the 12 to 14 hour day
of a few decades ago, or to recall the 1929
statistic of 20 million families (70 per cent
of the population) with family incomes of
less than $2,500, and 60 per cent of the
families with incomes of less than $1,500
a year?
But the greatest achievement in social
justice is the acknowledgment by leaders of
all segments of the community that man is
master of and dominates his economic sys-
tem; that the economic system is not an
end unto itself, but is merely a means to
further the common good; and that man has
a duty to act in the premises.
This statement of the progress of social
justice in the United States is not intended
to indicate an opinion that the millenium
has been reached. Obviously, there are
large areas unaffected by the good health of
the country. It is hardly the millenium, for
example, when twelve million married
women are working; when two million farm
families have incomes of less than $2,000 a
year; when our very physical survival is con-
ditioned upon moderation in the use of
Vodka. There are mountains of plenty in
our land, but there are also valleys of need.
The litany, then, is merely a progress
report. We have experienced social justice
and find it good-it promotes the common
13 Ibid.
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good. Who can measure the extent to which
the social encyclicals permeated American
thought and stimulated American action
during this period?
To return to the speculative order: what
is this common good to which social justice
is so intimately related? It is social peace
and temporal prosperity; it is the general
welfare; it is the purpose of society. Mari-
tain describes this concept of the common
good in some 750 words; but so well are
they chosen that I will risk a very lengthy
quotation.
Maritain says:
Thus, that which constitutes the common
good of political society is not only: the col-
lection of public commodities and services
-the roads, prots, schools, etc., which the
organization of common life presupposes; a
sound fiscal condition of the state and its
military power; the body of just laws, good
customs, and wise institutions, which pro-
vide the nation with its structure; the herit-
age of its great historical remembrances, its
symbols, and its glories, its living traditions
and cultural treasures. The common good
includes all of these and something much
more besides-something more profound,
more concrete and more human. For it in-
cludes also, and above all, the whole sum
itself of these; a sum which is quite dif-
ferent from a simple collection of juxtaposed
units. (Even in the mathematical order, as
Aristotle points out, 6 is not the same as 3
plus 3.) It includes the sum or sociological
integration of all the civic conscience, polit-
ical virtues, and sense of right and liberty,
of all the activity, material prosperity and
spiritual riches, of unconsciously operative
hereditary wisdom, of moral rectitude, jus-
tice, friendship, happiness, virtue and hero-
ism in the individual lives of its members.
For these things all are, in a certain measure,
communicable and so revert to each mem-
ber helping him to perfect his life and lib-
erty of person. They all constitute the good
human life of the multitude. 14
Messner as strongly emphasizes the re-
lationship to the individual of the end of
society. He says:
The end of society is the help which the
individuals obtain from social cooperation
as members of society for the fulfillment of
their existential ends. Individuals fulfill their
ends by their own activity. They are capable
of doing so, however, only because their
powers are complemented by social co-
operation. Since this mutual aid is made
available to all by the cooperation of all, it
is termed the common good or common
utility .... 15
Messner repeatedly emphasizes this basic
thought: that the purpose of society is to
enable men to attain their ends by their
own self-determination and self-activity, and
that the common good is ancillary and
supplemental.
The Holy Father in his 1942 Christmas
message said:
The scope of social life is perfection of
the human person... while every moral as-
sociation, if necessary, if we look to its ulti-
mate usefulness, is in the end directed to
the advancement of all and of every single
member. For they are persons.
Pieper states that the common good is
the good, viz., the very essence of those
good things for the sake of which the com-
munity exists, and which it must attain and
realize if all of its potentialities are to be
brought to fruition. 16 Then Pieper makes
the following very interesting suggestion:
For this very reason it appears impossible
to give a truly exhaustive, definitive defini-
14 MARITAIN, THE PERSON AND THE COMMON
GOOD 42 (1947).
15 MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS 118-119 (1949).
16 PIEPER, JUSTICE 87-88 (1955).
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tion of the bonum commune; for no one can
state with complete finality what the poten-
tialities of the human community are, what
the human community "fundamentally"
is. 1 7
Hence, the common good may be a
primordial idea not subject to further clari-
fication-a dramatic teutonic disposition of
a 750 word French definition!
We find at this point, therefore, a joinder
of the nature of man and the common good,
for the common good is itself determined by
the nature of man. As men, we are subject
to that built-in inclination, that built-in
urge: seek your ends. Messner sums up
these built-in ends of man as follows:
Self-preservation, including bodily integ-
rity and social respect (personal honor);
self-perfection physically and spiritually, in-
cluding the development of one's faculties
for the improvement of the conditions of
one's life, and provision for one's economic
welfare, including the necessary property or
income to provide for the future; the en-
largement of one's experience, knowledge
and receptivity of the values of beauty; self-
propagation by mating and the rearing of
offspring; benevolent interest in the spiritual
and material well-being of one's fellow-men
as equal in their value as human persons;
social fellowship to promote common util-
ity, which consists in the establishment of
peace and order, in facilitating the achieve-
ment of the material and cultural welfare
of all, in the attainment of the knowledge
and control of the forces of nature and
society for these purposes; the knowledge
and worship of the Creator, and the ulti-
mate fulfillment of one's self in union with
Him. 18
These are not mandates imposed upon
us by some conference of pseudo-intel-
lectuals. These are the facts of human
17 Id. at 88.
18 MESSNER, SOCIAL ETHICS 21 (1949).
existence. These ends are built-in; this is
our design. We have choices, but there are
signposts to happiness and built-in direc-
tional signals. And society serves the com-
mon good by assisting us to attain these
ends.
How are these ends related to social
justice and to supplemental unemployment
benefits (often referred to as "sub")?
Stability of individual income is, of course,
directly and immediately improved along
with all the other security aspects of em-
ployment. But, considering these individual
ends in the light of the ends of all members
of the community, the common good, then
we must consider the effect of "sub," not
only upon the individuals directly involved,
but also upon all other groups in the com-
munity, i.e., upon the entire wage and price
structure. In short, social justice demands
that we appraise "sub's" effect upon our en-
tire economy. Let's keep this question hang-
ing in the air for a few moments as we shift
to another principle which is relevant to the
issue.
Messner suggests that the obverse side of
the common good is the principle of sub-
sidiarity, and that subsidiarity is another
name for social justice. What, then, is this
principle of subsidiarity?
In Quadragesimo Anno, Pius XI de-
scribed it in the following words:
... [J]ust as it is wrong to withdraw from
the individual and commit to the community
at large what private enterprise and indus-
try can accomplish, so, too, it is an injustice,
a grave evil and a disturbance of right order
for a larger and higher organization to ar-
rogate to itself functions which can be per-
formed efficiently by smaller and lower
bodies. This is a fundamental principle of
social philosophy, unshaken and unchange-
able, and it retains its full truth today. Of its
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very nature the true aim of all social activity
should be to help individual members of the
social body, but never to destroy or absorb
them. 19
This principle of subsidiarity calls for the
highest feasible.degree of self-autonomy; a
person to the limits of his powers is to be
entrusted with self-determination and the
responsibility for the fulfillment of his own
ends. This principle of subsidiarity seems to
rest squarely upon man's most significant
freedom, freedom of the will, and upon the
conviction that man's faculties cannot be
developed without exercise. The greater the
range of choice, the higher the self-reliance;
the greater the personal responsibility, the
more of a man. This is the conviction that
man best achieves his personal and social
ends by his own action. Subsidiarity is the
do-it-yourself principle; as you move away
from personal responsibility, as others do-
it-for-you, you become less of a man.
And subsidiarity increases the effective-
ness of the action because there are forces
built in a man's will inclining him to protect
what is his own: to protect his own family,
his property, his community, his nation, his
human race, and through protecting these
things, thereby to protect his own perfection.
Now what of "sub" and social justice?
Do the latter's unalterable majestic impera-
tives command approval or disapproval of
"sub"?
What is the relationship between "sub"
and the common good? We must resolve
this question of fact by turning to what are
called principles of economics. Assume that
the end of our economy is the widest dis-
19 Quadregesimo Anno, para. 79, FIvE GREAT
ENCYCLICALS 147 (Paulist Press 1953).
tribution of economic goods through the
optimum production and the lowest price.
Our question then becomes: from the point
of view of social justice, how, if at all, will
"sub" affect the entire wage structure and
the entire price structure? Here, in my opin-
ion, enters a long parade of variables. The
relation of "sub" to the end of the economy
can be discerned only by a complicated
process of economic analysis applied to a
body of facts not yet in existence, or at least
not yet on the record.
A few samples of the facts not yet on the
record:
What will be the effect of "sub" on accel-
erating automation in other industries (i.e.,
will it increase labor costs to the point that
other groups will increase the tempo of au-
tomation and thus increase unemployment)?
Will it in fact stabilize employment, as all
hope, or will it shift the instability to sup-
pliers?
Will it help to prevent depressions by as-
suring a steady flow of purchasing power, or
will it force up prices thus reducing real
wages and inviting a depression?
These are the type of questions of fact
which the practical judgment must work
over before the practical judgment can re-
duce the gap between the universal laws and
the concrete situation; the imperatives oper-
ate through and upon men, not in a vacuum.
The natural law is a teleological thing. Here
is the end; here are the means; which are
the best means? But all the relevant facts
are'not on the record. So, it is submitted,
the answer to "sub" is essentially empirical,
and we must await it. The alternative to
waiting is to attempt to beat the air. What
will happen, for example, to predictions as
to the effect on our economy of "sub" if, as
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has been predicted, the peaceful use of
atomic energy results in annual family in-
comes in the United States of $25,000
within 80 years?
There are two respects however in which
I venture the opinion that the Ford "sub"
should evoke unqualified approval.
The conduct during the negotiations of
both Ford and the Union (UAW) has been
described as a model of responsible be-
havior. The Union, for example, gave three
years advance notice of what it would seek.
The New York Times referred to the con-
tract as "free American bargaining at its
best." This is the method of the natural
law. A problem is to be solved on some
basis other than whim, or arbitrary action,
or the flexing of muscles. From the public
relations releases that came to my atten-
tion, both Ford and the Union were hunger-
ing and thirsting after justice. I would
conclude that both were seeking the com-
mon good and social justice.
Secondly, isn't the Ford "sub" a prime
example of subsidiarity? This is a dynamic
economy. It is on the march at the rate of
a 2 per cent annual increase in production
for the past century. A dynamic economy
requires change. Change means temporary
unemployment. "Sub" merely socializes that
risk of temporary unemployment, which is
a necessary incident of a dynamic economy.
Current unemployment compensation rates
are out of joint with reality; they average
$25 a week. Will government aid be sought
or will private parties tackle this problem
themselves and attempt to work out a solu-
tion at a non-governmental level? Solving
this problem through a collective bargain-
ing agreement creates confidence in our
system of private economy. The alternative
is to seek relief exclusively at the govern-
mental level.
In these two respects at any rate (i.e.,
furthering both the principle of subsidiarity
and the employment of the natural law
method of prudence, the practical judg-
ment), I suggest that "sub" is in the finest
traditions of the natural law. It is maturity
and not decadence. And although we must
refrain from entering any judgment on
"sub" in its entirety, may one not say at
least that "sub" cannot be presently found
to be opposed to the natural law? A di-
rected verdict in favor of "sub" is not war-
ranted, but isn't there enough in the record
to let it go to the jury?
Finally, the natural law is not a sub-
stitute for thought. It is a mandate to think;
prudence is our most important product.
There are principles for guidance, but no
principle guarantees the right concrete
action for the common good.
Although in the mansion of the natural
law there is wide latitude for differences of
opinion as to diverse economic theories
(such as those underlying "sub"), we can-
not ignore the demands of social justice any
more than we can ignore a thermonuclear
explosion. Social justice may be difficult to
classify, but it packs a Marciano-punch.
Either the basic demands of social jus-
tice are actualized through self-determined
actions at levels consistent with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity, or confidence in our
social-economic-political system is dimin-
ished and those seeking social justice turn
to the provider state, the paternalistic state,
for relief; and the paternalistic state then
supplies the needs of the complacent, pas-
sive, un-men, until the millions of little cells
of repressed energy burst their bounds-
and the cycle starts again.
